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EGOTIATION ETHICS FOR REAL WORLD INTERACTIONS* 
 
By Charles B. Craver** 
      On the one hand the negotiator must be fair and truthful; on the other he must 
 mislead his opponent. Like the poker player, a negotiator hopes that his opponent 
 will overestimate the value of his hand. Like the poker player, . . . he must 
 facilitate his opponent’s inaccurate assessment. The critical difference 
 between those who are successful negotiators and those who are not lies in this 
 capacity both to mislead and not to be misled. . . . [A] careful examination of the 
 behavior of even the most forthright, honest, and trustworthy negotiators will 
 show them actively engaged in misleading their opponents about their true 
 positions. . . . To conceal one’s true position, to mislead an opponent about one’s 
 true settling point is the essence of negotiation.11 
 
      [T]he profession should embrace an affirmative ethical standard for attorneys’ 
 professional relationships with courts, other lawyers and the public: The lawyer 
 must act honestly and in good faith. Another lawyer . . . should not need to 
 exercise the same degree of caution that he would if trading for reputedly antique 
 copper jugs in an oriental bazaar. . . [S]urely the professional standards must 
 ultimately impose upon him a duty not to accept an unconscionable deal. While 
 some difficulty in line-drawing is inevitable when such a distinction is sought to 
 be made, there must be a point at which the lawyer cannot ethically accept an 
 arrangement that is completely unfair to the other side.2  
 
      If we have come to a point where the vast majority of those who study 
 negotiation across a range of disciplines would prescribe collaboration and 
 problem-solving over haggling and contention because it produces better results 
                                               
* Copyright 2009 by Charles B. Craver. 
 
** Freda H. Alverson Professor, George Washington University Law School. J.D., 1971, 
University of Michigan; M. Indus. & Lab. Rels., 1968, Cornell University School of 
Industrial & Labor Relations; B.S. 1967, Cornell University. 
 
1 James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 
1980 AMER. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 926, 927-28 (1980). “Deceitful or not, lies about 
price, value, and some other matters are practically sacrosanct to conventional 
negotiation. If lawyers were forbidden from engaging in these lies, they would be at a 
tremendous disadvantage when negotiating with any nonlawyer,” Walter W. Steele, Jr., 
Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1395 (1986). 
 
2  Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers’ Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 
589, 591 (1975) (emphasis in original). 
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 for clients, why would the legal profession continue to allow lawyers to choose an 
 outdated, less effective approach to negotiation?3 
 
 Should we base our negotiation ethics rules and practices on the current empirical 
 reality of expectations of “generally accepted conventions” (“background norms”) 





 Lawyers negotiate repeatedly. They actually engage in bargaining interactions 
when they do not even appreciate the fact they are negotiating. They interact with 
colleagues within their own firms, and they interact with prospective clients and current 
clients. They also negotiate on behalf of clients with external parties. Transactional 
attorneys work to structure diverse business arrangements, while litigators endeavor to 
resolve disputes.5 For decades, most law schools did not offer courses  in negotiation, 
apparently believing that such practical lawyering skills should not – or could not – be 
taught in law school class settings. They seemed to think that such skills could best be 
learned through on-the-job training once students entered legal practice.6 
                                               
3  Robet C. Bordone, Fitting the Ethics to the Forum: A Proposal for Process-Enabling 
Ethical Codes, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 1, 33 (2005) (emphasis in original). 
 
4 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility in Negotiaton 
in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS 119, 120 (Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth, eds., 
2002). 
 
5 They are usually successful, since fewer than five percent of cases are actually resolved 
by trials in federal and state courts. This fact would suggest that the term “litigator” is 
overused today, given the fact that trial attorneys could more reasonably be characterized 
as “problem solvers” or “dispute resolvers.” 
 
6  When I entered full-time law school teaching thirty-five years ago, I requested the 
opportunity to teach a legal negotiating course similar to the one I was then teaching as 
an adjunct professor at the University of California, Berkeley. My new dean immediately 
rejected this proposal, indicating that such a practical course had no place in a law school 
curriculum.  
 3 
 Over the past twenty-five years, most law schools have recognized the critical 
nature of negotiation skills, and they have established separate legal negotiation courses 
or incorporated negotiation training in alternative dispute resolution courses. When these 
courses were created, many teachers felt uncomfortable with the bargaining tactics 
discussed in negotiation books and being employed by students. Students who wished to 
obtain beneficial terms for their fictional clients over- and under-stated what they had to 
achieve or were willing to give up if mutual accords were going to be achieved. People 
like James J. White realized that the most effective way to induce students to work 
diligently on negotiation exercises involved a system in which the negotiation exercise 
results affected final course grades.7 
 Over the past thirty-five years, I have taught a two or three credit hour legal 
negotiation course. The students are assigned chapters in my book Effective Legal 
Negotiation and Settlement.8 We explore the impact of negotiator styles, the six stages of 
the negotiation process, verbal and nonverbal communication, negotiation techniques, the 
impact of such factors as anchoring, gain/loss framing, the endowment effect, the ego-
centric bias, the attribution bias, and regret aversion, specific negotiation issues such as 
telephone and e-mail interactions, and negotiation ethics. We contrast distributive 
bargaining designed to maximize own side returns with integrative bargaining designed 
to maximize the joint returns achieved by the parties.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
7  See generally James. J. White, The Lawyer as a Negotiator: An Adventure in 
Understanding and Teaching the Art of Negotiation, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 337 (1967). 
 
8  CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND 
SETTLEMENT (6th ed. 2009). 
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 During the term, the students engage in a series of negotiation exercises. 
Everyone receives the identical General Information which describes the relevant 
circumstances involved. The students are paired, and the individuals on each side receive 
Confidential Information pertaining to their fictional clients. The Confidential 
Information provides them with information concerning their respective clients, informs 
them of the specific issues to be negotiated, and assigns point values for each term to be 
addressed. Students can use these point structures to determine the overall value of any 
agreement achieved. They are also told how they will be evaluated if no agreement is 
reached. In most cases, they are told that if they do not obtain accords, they will be placed 
at the bottom of the individuals on their side. In other cases, they are told that 
nonsettlement parties will flip coins, role dice, or pull numbers out of a box containing a 
specified number of different nonsettlement results. 
 The first three or four interactions involve practice exercises designed to 
introduce students to the negotiation process, and these do not affect their course grades. 
They are then assigned five or six additional exercises that do impact their grades. At the 
conclusion of each bargaining interaction, the students on each side are rank ordered from 
high to low. If there are twenty-five pairs negotiating, the most successful students on 
each side get twenty-five placement points, the second highest students get twenty-four 
placement points, and so forth. Some exercises are conducted on a one-on-one basis, 
while others are done on a two-on-two basis. I provide them with partners to assist them 
with the more complex exercises, and to teach them how to interact effectively with 
persons on the same side. 
 5 
 Two thirds of student course grades are determined by their comparative 
negotiation exercise results, with the other one-third being based on a ten to fifteen page 
paper they must prepare evaluating different aspects of their negotiation exercises. If 
students do not feel comfortable with the overt grade competition associated with the 
class exercises, they may take the course on a credit/no-credit basis.  I inform the students 
that I grade generously, and guarantee the credit/no-credit students passing grades if they 
work on the assigned exercises and prepare acceptable class papers. I strongly urge 
students concerned about the competitive aspect of the grading process to take the class 
on a credit/no-credit basis. Due to the relatively generous grading curve we have at 
George Washington University, most students now take the course for a regular grade. 
 The students who take the course for traditional letter grades work diligently on 
the assigned exercises. They carefully review the General Information and Confidential 
Information sheets, and many do legal or factual research through Lexis, Westlaw, or the 
Internet. The students who take the course on a credit/no-credit basis do not work nearly 
as hard, and this lack of commitment is reflected in their negotiation performances. The 
students who take the class for letter grades achieve significantly better results on their 
negotiation exercises than their classmates who elect the credit/no-credit option.9 
 Over the past several years, I have taught a one credit hour negotiation class at 
George Washington University which meets for three and one-half hours on four 
consecutive Friday mornings. I have also taught the Peter Bronstein Negotiation Institute 
                                               
9  See Charles B. Craver, The Impact of a Pass/Fail Option on Negotiation Course 
Performance, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 176 (1998). See also Charles B. Craver, The Impact 
of Student GPAs and a Pass/Fail Option on Clinical Negotiation  Course Performance, 
15 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 373 (2000). 
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to 120 students each year at the University of Virginia Law School which meets on two 
consecutive Saturdays each fall. Both of these intensive one credit hour courses must be 
taken on a credit/no-credit basis. Although we cover the same concepts in these courses 
as we do in my full semester class and the students engage in a series of similar 
negotiation exercises, they do not take the exercises as seriously. As I watch different 
pairs negotiate, I can see how relaxed they are compared to traditional grade students in 
my full semester class. They have a good time interacting with other students, and clearly 
do not worry about the actual results they achieve. 
 As greater numbers of law professors began to teach negotiation courses, they 
became uncomfortable with student competition associated with exercises that affected 
course grades. They apparently felt that second and third year law students should not be 
exposed to the types bargaining environments they would encounter when they enter 
legal practice. The teachers feared that such competitive interactions would be too 
traumatic for sensitive students. These teachers thus developed what has become known 
as the communitarian approach. 
 The communitarian style is based on the integrative bargaining concepts 
developed over one hundred years ago by Mary Parker Follett10 and explored in the mid-
1960s by Professors Walton and McKersie.11 This approach gained general law school 
acceptance following the publication of Getting to Yes by Roger Fisher and William 
                                               
10  See JOAN C. TONN, MARY P. FOLLETT 360-388 (2003). 
 
11 See RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. McKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL 
THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (1965). 
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Ury.12 This style is based on the theory that most negotiations do not involve conflicted 
issues. If negotiators go behind the stated positions, which often appear to be opposite, 
and explore the underlying interests of the parties, they often discover solutions 
beneficial to both sides. Two persons are trying to decide how to divide an orange they 
both want. It may seem fair to divide it in half, until they discover that one wants the pulp 
to make juice while the other wants the rind to make zest. This discovery permits them to 
give one all of the pulp and the other all of the rind.13 
 Communitarians believe “that negotiation is a moral and ethical process, worthy 
of deep philosophical, political, legal, and human respect.”14 Their approach requires 
negotiating parties to be completely open and honest with each other with respect to their 
true interests and settlement intentions.15 Each side must candidly indicate the terms they 
desire and the true value placed on each, to enable the parties to achieve Pareto optimal 
                                               
12  ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981). 
 
13  A similar story concerns two children trying to decide how to divide a piece of cake. It 
might seem fair to have one cut the cake and let the other select the piece she wants. If 
the right question is asked first, however, one may indicate a preference for icing and the 
other a preference for cake, allowing each child to get 100 percent of what he or she 
actually prefers. 
 
14  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Ethics of Compromise in THE NEGOTIATOR’S 
FIELDBOOK 155, 156 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman, eds., 
2006). 
 
15  See Mark Young, Sharks, Saints, and Samurai: The Power of Ethics in Negotiations, 
24 NEG. J. 145, 150 (2008) (exhorting negotiators to always behave honorably simply 
because opponents deserve to be treated fairly). See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63 
(2002); Gary Tobias Lowenthal, The Bar’s Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining By 
Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (1988-89); Robert P. Burns, Some Ethical 
Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 691 (2001). 
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agreements which satisfy the underlying interests of each – i.e., “win-win” agreements 
instead of what are often characterized by commentators as “win-lose” accords that favor 
one side over the other. If negotiators are not entirely truthful with respect to their real 
interests and values, inefficiencies result or potentially beneficial accords are not 
achieved. 
 Communitarians do not like to engage in conventional distributive bargaining in 
which the opposing parties use deceptive tactics to enable them to claim more than a fair 
share for themselves. They have thus created a world in which negotiators have 
underlying interests that do not conflict with each other.16 Side A gives Side B what it 
prefers to have, while Side B gives Side A what it wants. The negotiators use a 
cooperative/problem-solving style which generates mutually beneficial and jointly 
efficient accords, instead of a competitive/adversarial style which produces one-sided and 
inefficient agreements. 
 Communitarians eschew deceptive bargaining tactics. They believe that attorneys 
should not be allowed to over- or under-state the way they actually value the different 
terms being exchanged, they do not think that lawyers should be permitted to 
misrepresent their true settlement intentions, and they believe that such tactics as bluffing 
should be proscribed.17 This approach is based upon the naïve belief that attorney 
bargaining interactions are primarily integrative, with few conflicting underlying 
interests. It assumes that lawyers rarely have to deal with distributive items that both 
                                               
16  See generally  Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining With a Hugger: The Weaknesses and 
Limitations of a Communitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, or Why We 
Can’t All Just Get Along, 9 CARDOZO J.  DISP. RES. 1 (2007). 
 
17  See generally Bordone, supra Note 3.. See also Chris Provis, Ethics, Deception and 
Labor Negotiation, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 145 (Nov. 2000). 
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sides value and wish to claim for themselves. It ignores the fact that in legal interactions, 
“opportunities for integrative bargaining are not nearly as pervasive as sometimes 
authoritatively asserted”,18 due to the fact that monetary issues tend to dominate such 
circumstances.  
 [M]ost negotiations are “mixed motive”; they include both opportunities for joint 
 gain, and opportunities for grabbing more from the other side. . . [S]tragegies that 
 are wise for creating are often opposite from those that are wise for claiming (e.g., 
 deception about positions and power is necessary for claiming, while deception 
 about interests is disruptive for creating). But all negotiations include both 
 elements, and few negotiations occur where a wise negotiator would not employ 
 at least some of each set of behaviors. Indeed, one of the more interesting 
 challenges faced by negotiators is how to balance both of these elements.19 
 
 When they teach legal negotiation courses, communitarians value agreements that 
maximize the joint returns achieved and that fairly divide the different items between the 
negotiating parties. Students who adhere to this standard earn higher grades, while 
students who behave competitively and obtain terms more beneficial to themselves than 
to the other side earn lower grades. The students are thus rewarded for their complete 
openness regarding their underlying interests and settlement intentions and their ability to 
reach agreements that are of equal value to both sides. 
 This article will initially discuss the current ethical rules governing lawyer 
conduct during bargaining interactions, and the standards that communitarians would like 
                                               
18  Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369, 372 
(1996). 
 
19  Raymond A. Friedman & Debra Shapiro, Deception and Mutual Gains Bargaining: 
Are They Mutually Exclusive? 11 NEG. J. 243, 247 (1995). See id. at 248-49; Gerald 
Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiation, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1245-48 (1990); 
Garry T. Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and Behavior, 
31 U. KAN. L. REV. 69, 75 (1982). 
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to impose on practicing attorneys. It will then explore the different negotiator styles 
employed by legal practitioners to see which ethics approach is most reflective of real 
world encounters. It will then examine the way in which the Model Rules and traditional 
concepts of fraud should be applied to overt misrepresentations, partial disclosures, and 
non-disclosures. Inappropriate tactics and unconscionable agreements will then be 
assessed. The article will finally evaluate the ethical issues associated with the 
collaborative and cooperative law movements which are based on the communitarian 
approach. 
 
II.      ETHICAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO BARGAINING INTERACTIONS 
 
 When I teach negotiation skills to law students or to practicing attorneys, I often 
ask if they can lie during their interactions. They usually respond negatively. I then talk 
about two lawyers engaged in a negotiation where Side A is authorized to accept 
anything over $100,000 while Side B is authorized to pay anything up to $130,000. We 
thus have a $30,000 zone of possible agreement between the $100,000 and $130,000 
positions. The parties begin with small talk, then move on to the serious discussions. At 
an appropriate point, Side A says it can’t accept anything less than $160,000, and Side B 
responds that it can’t go a penny over $70,000. Both sides are pleased that they have 
begun the process successfully, yet they have both begun with bold-faced lies.  
 Audience members become uncomfortable. They all recall times they have 
commenced bargaining encounters with exaggerated position statements they did not 
expect their opponents to take literally. I then quote from Model Rule 4.1 which provides 
that “a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a 
 11 
third person.”20 Rule 4.1 is a paragon of clarity: A lawyer may not lie. Comment 1 
confirms this interpretation when it states that a “lawyer is required to be truthful when 
dealing with others on a client’s behalf . . .” When is a lie not a lie? When it is by a 
lawyer! Comment 2 acknowledges that attorneys involved in bargaining interactions have 
different expectations. 
 
 Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on 
 the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain 
 types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. 
 Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party’s 
 intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this 
 category, . . .21 
 
 
                                               
20  See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2008 SELECTED 
STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  92 (2008). See also Model 
Rule 8.4(c) which states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:  . . .  (c) 
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” See id. at 
128. 
 
 Negotiators commonly hide their true level of dependency and commonly 
 exaggerate the value of their options in the event of no agreement, their 
 willingness and ability to choose other options, and the likelihood that their 
 constituents (whose supposed demands may even be fabricated) will 
 disapprove of concessions under discussion. . . . 
 
 [W]hether deception is considered ethical or not depends on the context, not the 
 act of deceiving. 
 
Friedman & Shapiro, supra Note 19, at 245. 
 
21  See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra Note 20, at 93. See also Maurice E. Schweitzer 
& Rachel Croson, Curtailing Deception: The Impact of Direct Questions on Lies and 
Omissions, 10 INTL. J. CONFLICT MGT. 225, 227 (1999) (“[N]egotiators typically 
consider lies about one’s reservation price to be acceptable, but consider fabrications 
about material facts to be unethical.”); Brian C. Haussmann, Note: The ABA Ethical 
Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations: Exceeding the Limits of the Adversarial Ethic, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 1218 (2004). 
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 Although Rule 4.1 unequivocally proscribes lawyer prevarication, Comment 2 
excludes puffing, embellishment, and dissembling with respect to a negotiator’s true 
settlement objectives.22 This Comment acknowledges the reality of bargaining 
interactions between legal practitioners. 
 [N]egotiation often cannot take place if the parties must reveal the existence of 
 a principal, their true asking price, or their intention regarding settlement 
 throughout the bargaining process. Deception concerning value as well as 
 deception concerning settlement point in particular are consistent with 
 functionalism because they are recognizable as bargaining techniques and allow 
 accurate information to be achieved through bargaining.23 
 
The truly ironic aspect of this exception to Rule 4.1 concerns the fact that there are really 
only two things that are material when attorneys negotiate. The legal, factual, economic, 
political, and cultural issues are all secondary. What each participant must ascertain is the 
degree to which the other values each of the items being discussed and the amount of 
each that must be conceded if an agreement is to be achieved. Nonetheless, most 
practicing lawyers do not expect such candor. They also realize how difficult it is for 
state bar associations to regulate this area due to the private nature of bargaining 
interactions. 
 
 If one negotiator lies to another, only by happenstance will the other discover 
 the lie. If the settlement is concluded by negotiation, there will be no trial, no 
 public testimony by conflicting witnesses, and thus no opportunity to examine 
 the truthfulness of assertions made during the negotiations. Consequently, in 
                                               
22  See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 167-68 (1995); 
Gary T. Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and Behavior, 
31 KAN. L. REV. 69, 101 (1982); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer’s Obligation to 
Be Trustworthy When Dealing With Opposing Parties, 33 S. CAR. L. REV. 181, 183 
(1981); Raymond A. Friedman & Debra L. Shapiro, Deception and Mutual Gains 
Bargaining: Are They Mutually Exclusive? 11 NEG. J. 243, 245 (1995).  
 
23  Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
493, 537 (1989). 
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 negotiation, more than in other contexts, ethical norms can probably be 
 violated with greater confidence that there will be no discovery and punishment.24 
 
 
 Although lawyer prevarication during bargaining interactions rarely results in bar 
disciplinary action, practitioners recognize that other risks are associated with 
inappropriately dishonest negotiating conduct. Whether attorneys function as generalists 
in smaller communities or specialists in larger areas, they begin to see the same persons 
repeatedly. If someone is discovered misrepresenting what the other side has the right to 
know, their reputation will suffer.25 The persons who discern the violation of trust are 
likely to tell others in their own firm. They and their colleagues will often tell lawyers in 
other firms. When negotiators can no longer be trusted with respect to representations 
pertaining to material factual, economic, or legal issues, they will find it difficult to 
interact with others. Instead of accepting what such individuals say, opponents have to 
verify everything they assert. Instead of relying on literal or figurative handshakes, all 
agreements have to be reduced to writing and signed. The negotiation process is 
substantially undermined, and bargaining interactions take longer and are more difficult. 
 When I teach my negotiation class, I have the Model Rules in force. If a student is 
accused of a violation, a trial would take place in front of the class. In all the years I have 
taught my course, I have never had to conduct a trial. Instead of filing formal charges of 
deceit, the accusers simply raise the issues informally before the class. The accusers and 
the accused are permitted to explain their positions, and I ask class members whether 
                                               
24  James J. White, supra Note 1, at 926. 
 
25  See Peter C. Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An 
Exercise in Practical Ethics, 3 BUS. ETHICS Q. 359, 369 (1993). 
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they think the conduct in question was appropriate or inappropriate. In most instances, 
students suggest that the challenged statements involved mere “puffing” or acceptable 
“embellishment.” On rare occasions, however, they indicate a belief that the 
misrepresentations were improper. By the end of the semester, the students being 
discussed end up with one or two nonsettlements simply because their future opponents 
do not trust their representations and are hesitant to enter into agreements with them. If 
they cannot be sure of the fundamental information being conveyed by these persons, 
they do not feel comfortable interacting with them.26 These results graphically 
demonstrate to everyone the importance of relative honesty. While puffing and 
embellishment do not undermine future interactions, inappropriate mendacity makes it 
difficult for disreputable actors to achieve future accords.27 
 Basic trust is essential to bargaining interactions.28 The participants have to be 
willing to disclose their true needs and interests if the negotiators hope to achieve mutual 
                                               
26  See Carol M. Rose, Lecture: Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 
539-41 (1995). 
 
27  See Debra L. Shapiro, Blair H. Sheppard & Lisa Cheraskin, Business on a Handshake, 
8 NEG. J. 365, 366-67 (1992) (discussing the degree to which mutual trust enables 
business partners to interact with each other efficiently and with minimal need for 
monitoring); Menkel-Meadow, supra Note 4, at 160 (“[L]awyers who are perceived as 
unethical are also perceived as ineffective.”). See also David A. Lax & James K. 
Sebenius, Three Ethical Issues in Negotiation, 2 NEG. J. 363, 364 (1986): “[A] lie 
always leaves a drop of poison behind, and even the most dazzling diplomatic success 
gained by dishonesty stands on an insecure foundation, for it awakes in the defeated a 
party a sense of aggravation, a desire for vengeance, and a hatred which must always be 
menace to his foe . . .” (quoting Francois de Callieres). 
 
28  See generally Roy Lewicki, Trust and Distrust in THE NEGOTIATOR’S 
FIELDBOOK 191, 196-99 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman, eds., 
2006). “[H]igher levels of trust make negotiation easier, while lower levels of trust make 
negotiation more difficult.” Id. at 197. 
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accords – especially if they hope to generate efficient agreements.29 If one side does not 
trust the other, it will be hesitant to disclose its own confidential information and 
underlying values, fearing exploitation by manipulative and less candid opponents. On 
the other hand, negotiators must be careful, even when interacting with honest opponents, 
not to be too forthcoming, lest they naively permit skilled adversaries to claim an 
excessive share of the surplus involved.30 
 Communitarian professors I know do not simply require their students to comply 
with Model Rule 4.1 and the exceptions set forth in Comment 2 with respect to 
bargaining interactions. They instead proscribe traditional “puffing,” “embellishment,” 
and bluffing. They require their students to be entirely candid regarding their underlying 
interests, the degree to which they value those interests, and the terms they have to obtain 
if minimally acceptable agreements are to be achieved. They praise students who 
generate efficient agreements that divide the items to be negotiated on a relatively equal 
basis. They indicate that students who obtain one-sided accords favoring their own sides 
will be down-graded, even if they obtain these results honestly. 
 The Model Rules are somewhat ambiguous when it endeavors to define the duty 
owed by attorneys to their clients. In the Preamble, it states that when negotiating on 
                                               
29  See Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEG. J. 389, 
391 (1991); Catherine H. Tinsley, Jack J. Cambria & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, 
Reputations in Negotiation in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK (Andrea Kupfer 
Schneider & Christopher Honeyman, eds.) 203, 207-209 (2006). 
 
30  See Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers’ Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The 
End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 475, 482-83 (2005); Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1, 32, 36 (1987); Chris Provis, Ethics, Deception and Labor Negotiation, 28 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 145, 147 (2000). 
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behalf of a client, “a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with 
requirements of honest dealings with others.”31 Rule 1.3 indicates that “[a] lawyer shall 
act with reasonable diligence . . . in representing a client.”32 Comment 1 expands upon 
this fiduciary obligation. 
      A lawyer should . . . take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to 
 vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment 
 and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the 
 client’s behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that 
 might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to 
 exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter 
 should be pursued. The lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not 
 require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved 
 in the legal process with courtesy and respect.33 
 
 I believe that the general obligations set forth in the Preamble and in Rule 1.3 and 
Comment 1 oblige attorneys to seek terms beneficial to their own clients when they 
negotiate on behalf of those persons.34 I think this is true whether they are acting in an 
advocate capacity (e.g., representing a client in litigation) or a nonadvocate capacity. 
 When acting in a nonadvocate capacity on behalf of a client, a lawyer must, 
 within the established constraints on professional behavior, attempt to achieve the 
 client’s objectives, unless to do so would require that the lawyer use unfair, 
 unconscionable, or unjust, though not unlawful, means or that the client achieve 
 unfair, unconscionable, or unjust, though not unlawful, ends, in which event the 
 lawyer need not accept or continue the representation.”35   
                                               
31  MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra Note 20, at 3. 
 
32  Id. at 15. 
 
33  Id. at 15. See Menkel-Meadow, supra Note 4, at 126-27. 
 
34  “A negotiator-agent is under a duty to act solely for the benefit of the client-principal 
in all matters within the scope of the agency.”  Rex R. Perschbacher, Regulating 
Lawyers’ Negotiations, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 75, 83 (1985). 
 
35  See Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers in 
WHAT’S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS 329, 333 ((Carrie Menkel-Meadow & 
Michael Wheeler, eds., 2004) (emphasis in original). 
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 “Professionalism means that a lawyer should . . . zealously and competently use 
all lawful means to protect and advance the client’s lawful interests.”36 While legal 
representatives are not required to strive for entirely one-sided agreements favoring their 
own clients, I do not think they should forego terms that favor their own clients merely 
because they personally desire to divide the issues in an egalitarian manner. “Any 
deviation from [the] current norm would jeopardize the coveted attorney-client 
relationship and change the role of an attorney from that of an advocate to one of ‘social 
policeman’.”37 If their clients were to instruct them to divide the terms equally, this 
would be fine. On the other hand, where clients wish to obtain accords that advance their 
own interests, their attorneys should work to accomplish that objective. While legal 
practitioners may not employ unethical tactics – and need not resort to unprofessional or 
offensive behavior – I believe they have an ethical duty to seek terms advantageous to 
their own clients.38 
                                                                                                                                            
 
36  Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41 
EMORY L.J. 467, 470 (1992). See W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional 
Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1999); Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining 
in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. 
REV. 1, 3, 68-72 (1992). 
 
37  Paul Rosenberger, Note & Comment: Laissez-“Fair”: An Argument for the Status 
Quo Ethical Constraints on Lawyers as Negotiators, 13 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 611, 
614 (1998). “Attorneys who naively believe that no deception is proper during bargaining 
encounters place themselves and their clients at a distinct disadvantage, because they 
permit their less candid opponents to obtain settlements and ‘transcend the terms to 
which they are objectively entitled’.” Id. at 626. 
 
38  See W Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 58-67 (1999). 
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 Negotiating attorneys have no obligation to act in a win-lose manner designed to 
deprive opposing parties of fair terms simply to satisfy the desires of vindictive clients. 
Nor do they ever have to act in an inappropriate fashion. All proficient negotiators 
recognize that they should always behave professionally and strive for efficient 
agreements that maximize the joint returns achieved by the different parties. This leaves 
opponents more satisfied with what they received, and makes it more likely that they will 
honor the accords achieved. Nonetheless, if negotiating attorneys can professionally and 
ethically obtain more generous terms for their own clients, I believe they are obliged to 
do so. 
 When I teach my graded negotiation class, I am amazed how diligently students 
work to negotiate agreements that favor their own clients. I am also pleased at how 
efficient most of their accords are, because I emphasize the communitarian theory of 
bargaining efficiency and encourage students to maximize opponent returns when this 
can be accomplished at minimal cost to themselves. On rare occasions, students are so 
deceptive regarding their true interests and settlement intentions that they achieve 
inefficient agreements that place the persons on both sides below average. We then 
discuss what they could have done to avoid such a situation. By the end of the term, the 
students generally achieve highly efficient agreements that even communitarians would 
respect – but they strive for accords that are more favorable to their own clients than to 
the other side. In this regard, they do contravene a basic tenet of communitarian 
bargaining. 
III.     IMPACT OF NEGOTIATOR STYLES ON BARGAINING INTERACTIONS 
 19 
 Most negotiation books and negotiation teachers divide negotiators into two 
stylistic groups: cooperative/problem-solvers and competitive/adversarials. 
Cooperative/problem-solvers, who most closely resemble communitarians, are 
epitomized by Getting to Yes and Beyond Winning.39 Such negotiators move 
psychologically toward their opponents, and they strive to maximize the returns achieved 
by both sides. They begin with realistic opening positions and seek reasonable and fair 
results. They behave in a courteous and professional manner, and rely upon objective 
criteria to enable them to reason with their opponents. They eschew threatening behavior, 
and are open and trusting. They try to maximize the disclosure of critical information, to 
enable the participants to explore their respective underlying interests in an effort to 
achieve Pareto efficient agreements. They explore different alternatives that may allow 
the participants to expand the overall pie through exchanges that simultaneously advance 
the interests of both sides. For example, when money is an issue, they consider the use of 
future payments or in-kind payments that would effectively satisfy the underlying 
interests of the party seeking cash. 
 The competitive/adversarial style is epitomized by books like Start With No 
and40Secrets of Power Negotiating.41 Such negotiators move psychologically against 
their opponents, and they work to maximize their own side’s returns. They begin their 
                                               
39  ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, 
BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND 
DISPUTES (2000).  See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal 
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754 (1984). 
 
40  JIM CAMP, START WITH NO (2002). 
 
41  ROGER DAWSON, SECRETS OF POWER NEGOTIATING (2d ed. 2001). 
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interactions with unreasonable opening positions, and seek extreme results favoring their 
own side. They often behave in an adversarial and competitive manner. They focus 
primarily on their own positions, and often resort to threats. They are closed, untrusting, 
and manipulative. They minimize the disclosure of their own information, and they try to 
achieve their own goals while making minimal concessions to the other side.  
 Competitive/adversarial negotiators often engage in disingenuous game-playing. 
They conceal negative information and overstate their positive information. In their effort 
to advance their own interests, they may ignore alternative formulations that might 
benefit their opponents if those options do not advance their own interests. Their primary 
objective is the advancement of their own situations, and they care little about the results 
achieved by their opponents. 
 The first major empirical study of lawyer negotiator styles was conducted in 1976 
by Gerald Williams in Phoenix.42 Williams asked attorneys to classify lawyers with 
whom they had recently interacted. Sixty-five percent of practitioners were characterized 
as cooperative/problem-solvers, twenty-four percent as competitive/adversarial, and 
eleven percent were not placed in either category.43 He then asked his respondents to 
indicate which of these individuals were effective negotiators, average negotiators, and 
ineffective negotiators. Fifty-nine percent of cooperative/problem-solvers were rated 
effective, thirty-eight percent were rated average, and three percent were rated 
ineffective. Only twenty-five percent of competitive/adversarials were rated effective, 
forty-two percent were rated average, and thirty-three percent were rated ineffective. 
                                               
42  GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1983). 
 
43  See id. at 19. 
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 In 1999, Andrea Schneider replicated the Williams’ study with attorneys in 
Milwaukee and Chicago.44 She found that sixty-four percent of attorneys were described 
by their peers as cooperative/problem-solvers, while thirty-six percent were considered 
competitive/adversarial.45 Fifty-four percent of cooperative/problem-solvers were rated 
effective, versus only nine percent of competitive/adverarials, while only four percent of 
cooperative/problem-solvers were rated ineffective compared to fifty-three percent of 
competitive/adversarials.46  
 When the Williams and Schneider studies are compared, it is interesting to note 
two significant changes. While the proportion of effective cooperative/problem-solvers 
declined slightly from the 1976 study to the 1999 study, from fifty-nine percent to fifty-
four percent, the proportion of effective competitive/adversarials dropped from twenty-
five percent to nine percent.47 At the other extreme, while the proportion of ineffective 
cooperative/problem-solvers increased slightly from 1976 to 1999, from three percent to 
four percent, the proportion of ineffective competitive/adversarials rose from thirty-three 
percent to fifty-three percent.  
 The empirical findings by Williams and Schneider seem to support the 
communitatian claim that effective negotiators generally employ a cooperative/problem-
solving style which encourages complete openness and a desire to maximize the joint 
                                               
44  Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the 
Effectiveness of Negotiator Style, 7 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 143 (2002). 
 
45  See id. at 163. 
 
46  Id. at 167. 
 
47  Ibid. 
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returns achieved. A closer examination of their findings, however, suggests that many 
wolves may be disguised as sheep. Both Williams and Schnedier asked the effective 
negotiators from both groups to list their major goals. The number one objective for 
effective competitive/adversarials was predictably to maximize their own returns.48 This 
factor is the quintessential characteristic of competitive negotiators. Nonetheless, when 
effective cooperative/problem-solvers listed their primary goals, they indicated that 
maximizing their own returns was their second objective – just behind their desire to 
maintain ethical standards.49 A closer examination of these factors has caused Williams 
and me to recognize the existence of a hybrid stylistic category between 
cooperative/problem-solving and competitive/adversarial, which combines the optimal 
traits of both. 
 Competitive/problem-solvers are negotiators who seek competitive objectives – 
the maximizing of their own returns – but do so in a non-adversarial manner. They also 
strive to maximize opponent returns – once they have achieved their own primary goals.50 
These persons are more open than competitive/adversarials, but less forthcoming than 
true cooperative/problem-solvers.  They indicate which items they really hope to obtain, 
recognizing that such disclosures are critical if the parties hope to achieve efficient 
agreements,51 but they over- and under-state true client values for strategic purposes. 
                                               
48  See WILLIAMS, supra Note 42, at 23; Schneider, supra Note 44, at 179. 
 
49  See WILLIAMS, supra Note 42, at 20; Schneider, supra Note 44, at 170. 
 
50  See GERALD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES B. CRAVER, LEGAL NEGOTIATING 
64-65 (2007). 
 
51  See Alan Strudler, On the Ethics of Deception in Negotiation, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 805, 
814 (1995). 
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 When competitive/problem-solvers interact with naïve cooperative/problem-
solvers, they try to exploit their opponents’ openness.52 They work to create value in the 
Getting to Yes tradition, but then employ disingenuous tactics to claim more of the 
bargaining surplus than they give to their opponents.53 Unsuspecting lawyers do not 
appreciate how manipulative competitive/problem-solvers are. They thus classify these 
adroit negotiators as cooperative/problem-solvers. They think these persons are being 
completely open and forthright, when they are not being so candid. They thus reciprocate 
the seeming openness of such bargainers, without realizing that their openness is not 
being entirely reciprocated.54 They think that these individuals are trying to achieve “win-
win” results, when they are actually seeking “WIN-win” distributions.55 
                                                                                                                                            
 
52  See Steven Hartwell, Understanding and Dealing With Deception in Legal 
Negotiation, 6 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 171, 173-75, 185-86 (1991). 
 
53   [E]ven within the range of circumstances in which there are significant 
 opportunities for integrative bargaining, the bargainer must almost always engage 
 in distributive bargaining as well. Therefore, it is in the bargainer’s self-interest 
 not just to adopt the tactics of openness and truth-telling that are said to be 
 appropriate to integrative bargaining, but somehow also to adopt the tactics of 
 truth-hiding and dissimulation that are said to be appropriate to distributive 
 bargaining. 
 
Wetalufer, supra Note 18, at 390-91. See Lowenthal, supra Note 19, at 82; Robert J. 
Condlin, supra Note 16, at 65-66; Raymond A. Friedman & Debra L. Shapiro, supra 
Note 19, at 247-250. 
 
54  See Tinsley, Cambria & Schneider, supra Note 29, at 207-08 (indicating how much 
more open cooperative/problem-solvers are when they think they are interacting with 
other cooperative/problem-solvers). 
 




 Kieth Allred found this approach to function effectively when he conducted 
empirical studies of factors associated with proficient negotiators. He explored the degree 
to which skilled negotiators employ “strategic practices” designed to enable them to 
claim more value for themselves and “integrating and accommodating practices” 
designed to maximize the joint returns achieved. He found that the most capable 
negotiators were considered by opponents to use primarily “integrating and 
accommodating practices,” even though these interactors admitted that they employed 
“strategic practices” to advance their own interests.56 
 Haggling permits bargainers to learn about, adjust to, and accommodate the 
 interests of other bargainers. It permits them to change minds, weaken 
 convictions, make trades, call attention to facts not fully considered, revive 
 considerations dismissed prematurely, and express the nature of their 
 interests and the intensity of their resolve.57 
 
 The findings of Williams and Schneider would strongly suggest that a number of 
lawyers who agree to abide by collaborative or cooperative law communitarian standards 
of conduct are somewhat disingenuous. They do not begin with the more extreme 
positions employed by competitive/adversarials, but they do not begin with the truly 
reasonable positions articulated by real cooperative/problem-solvers. They instead begin 
with somewhat over-stated demands or under-stated offers. They do acknowledge their 
real objectives, but under- and over-state the degree to which they desire those items. 
They are quite efficient at creating value, as they get the important terms on the 
                                               
56 See Keith G. Allred, Distinguishing  Best and Strategic Practices: A Framework for 
Managing the Dilemma Between Creating and Claming Value, 2000 NEGOT. J. 387, 
394-95 (2000).  
 
57  Robert J. Condlin, “Every Day and in Every Way We Are All Becoming Meta and 
Meta,” or How Communitarian Bargaining Theory Conquered the World (of Bargaining 
Theory), 23 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 231, 268 (2008). 
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bargaining table. On the other hand, they subtly employ manipulative techniques 
designed to allow them to claim more than their fair share of the joint value that has been 
discovered.58 
 Why are competitive/problem-solvers able to achieve their one-sided objectives 
without being obvious to opposing attorneys? They intuitively recognize the fact that 
negotiators usually judge their satisfaction with bargaining results more by the degree to 
which they think the process was fair and respectful than by the objective value to the 
terms they actually obtained.59 Competitive/problem-solvers are pleasant and respectful 
negotiators. They eschew openly competitive tactics, and behave as if they are 
cooperative/problem-solvers. Their opponents are so pleased by the way these individuals 
behave and the way in which the negotiation process develops that they over-value the 
objective value of the results they actually obtain. 
 It is easy to understand why communitarians believe that two-thirds of legal 
negotiators employ the cooperative/problem-solving style they respect, even though 
many of the negotiators placed in this category actually employ the competitive/problem-
solving style. These persons seem to be entirely open and interested in the generation of 
fair and efficient agreements that maximize the joint returns achieved by the parties. They 
always behave in a respectful and professional manner. They do not seem to over- or 
under-state their true needs, nor do they appear to misrepresent their actual settlement 
                                               
58  See Wetlaufer, supra  Note 19, at 1228-29. 
 
59  See generally Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in 
Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473 (2008); Nancy A.Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in THE 
NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 165, 170-71 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher 
Honeyman, eds. 2006). 
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intentions. When they are successful, their opponents have no idea how adroitly these 
proficient bargainers have used subtly manipulative tactics to advance their own interests. 
IV.    OVERT MISREPRESENTATIONS, PARTIAL DISCLOSURES,                                                                             
 NONDISCLOSURES, AND INAPPROPRIATE ACCESS TO OPPONENT 
 INFORMATION 
 
 When I teach negotiating skills to students and practicing lawyers, I often indicate 
that I have never participated in a legal negotiation – as an advocate or mediator – where 
both sides did not lie, yet I have encountered almost no attorneys I thought were 
dishonest.60 This seeming contradiction is based upon the fact that they have all engaged 
in “puffing” and “embellishment.” They have over- and under-stated client values, and 
misstated their true settlement intentions, but have almost never misrepresented other 
factual or legal issues of a material nature.  
      In certain bargaining situations, we . . . play . . . mutually deceptive roles; . . . 
 [F]alse claims are a convention; . . . If buyers and sellers bargain knowingly and 
 voluntarily, one would be hard put to regard as misleading their exaggerations, 
 false claims to have given their last bid, or words of feigned loss of interest. Both 
 parties have then consented to the rules of the game.61 
 
 As noted earlier, while Rule 4.1 prohibits the knowing misrepresentation of 
material fact or law, Comment 2 expressly recognizes that statements regarding client 
values and settlement intentions made during bargaining interactions do not concern 
                                               
60  “Bargaining is a unique process in which the parties engage in stylized strategic 
behavior and use practices such as bluffing, puffing, and withholding information as a 
matter of course.” Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethics of Process, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 506 (1989). See Scott R. Peppet, Mindfulness in the Law and ADR: 
Can Saints Negotiate? A Brief Introduction to the Problems of Perfect Ethics in 
Bargaining, 7 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 83, 91-92 (2002). 
 




material fact.62 It is thus ethical for negotiating attorneys to deliberately misrepresent 
such matters. They may do this overtly, partially, or through the nondisclosure of 
information. 
 A.   Overt Misrepresentations 
 Assume that two attorneys are negotiating a marital dissolution for their 
respective clients. May one lawyer ethically indicate that her client desires joint custody 
of the young children, even though her client does not, hoping to use this issue to obtain 
other terms she actually desires? Since this matter concerns client values, the 
misrepresentation does not involve material fact. Suppose the lawyer knows that her 
client has $50,000 in a secret bank account. Could she deny the existence of that account 
or understate the actual amount in it? These misrepresentations would clearly pertain to 
material facts and would thus contravene Rule 4.1. Such misstatements of material fact 
could also expose the client to a suit for fraud, based upon the material misrepresentation 
that was reasonably relied upon by the other spouse to his or her detriment. 
 Similar factual issues could easily arise in a personal injury case. May a plaintiff 
attorney embellish the discomfort associated with a sprained ankle suffered by the 
claimant due to the defendant’s negligence? Clearly yes, so long as the statements are not 
entirely beyond the bounds of anything reasonable persons would characterize as mere 
puffing. Could the plaintiff attorney falsely state that the claimant’s ankle is broken? Not 
without contravening Rule 4.1 and exposing his client to an action for fraud, since this 
would involve a misrepresentation of material fact. Suppose the plaintiff’s ankle has 
almost healed, and that person is skiing down the slopes in Colorado. Could the claimant 
                                               
62  See Notes 20 & 21, and accompanying text, supra. 
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attorney indicate that his client is only able to move with the assistance of crutches and 
special attachments to the feet? Such factual statements would certainly be considered 
improper and fraudulent, since they go well beyond puffing and are contrary to the real 
circumstances. 
 Suppose an attorney is negotiating the sale of a business for a client. The owner of 
the firm would like to obtain $50 million, but would seriously consider offers in the $40 
to $45 million range. Could the business lawyer tell a prospective buyer that her client 
would not accept anything less than $55 million? The answer is clearly yes, since this 
statement concerns client settlement intentions that do not constitute material information 
within the meaning of Rule 4.1.63 Could she state that other parties will undoubtedly be 
interested in her client’s firm, even if no one else has yet contacted her client about a 
possible purchase? Most lawyers would consider such a statement to be mere puffing and 
permissible under acceptable negotiation ethical standards, even though such positional 
misstatements would be likely to help the speaker obtain an advantage at the bargaining 
table.64 It would similarly be acceptable to most persons for the seller’s representative to 
talk generally about the golden future of the business, even if she somewhat over-stated 
                                               
63  “An obligation to negotiate “in good faith” nixes trickery and certain forms of 
obduracy, . . . but it does not require one side in negotiations to reveal its bargaining 
strategy or reservation price, . . .” PSI Energy, Inc. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc.,17 F.3d 969, 
973 (7th Cir. 1994). See Russell Korobkin, Michael L. Moffitt & Nancy A. Welsh, The 
Law of Bargaining  in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 183, 184 (Andrea Kupfer 
Schneider & Christopher Honeyman, eds., 2006). 
 
64  See Roy J. Lewicki & Robert J. Robinson, Ethical and Unethical Bargaining Tactics: 
An Empirical Study, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 665, 666-67 (1998); Alan Strudler, 
Incommensurable Goods, Rightful Lies, and the Wrongfulness of Fraud, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1529, 1540-41 (1998). 
 
 29 
the actual situation, since such embellishments are normally not considered to concern 
statements of material fact.65 
 If the firm attorney obtains a $42 million offer from one party, may she indicate 
that her side has an offer from a different party when they have not received any such 
offer? When I have discussed this question with corporate counsel at continuing legal 
education programs, the vast majority suggest that such a misstatement would not be 
appropriate. It is not mere puffery, but concerns an issue of material fact – whether 
another party has made a definitive offer to purchase the business in question. I agree 
with this viewpoint. While it is almost certainly acceptable to indicate that other parties 
would have an interest in the firm, with such a general statement constituting mere 
puffery, it is inappropriate for the lawyer to make a knowingly false statement regarding 
the existence of another bidder. 
 Suppose the seller receives an offer of $45 million form another party. Could the 
firm attorney tell the $42 million bidder that they have received a $50 million offer? I 
believe that such a deliberate misrepresentation would both contravene Rule 4.1 and 
                                               
65  See, e.g., Royal Business Machines v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 42 (7th Cir. 1980);  
Vaughn v. General Foods Corp., 797 F.2d 1403 (7th Cir. 1986); Vulcan Metals Co. v. 
Simmons Mfgr. Co., 248 F. 853 (2d Cir. 1918).  
 
 It is common knowledge and may always be assumed that any seller will express 
 a favorable opinion concerning what he has to sell; and when he praises it in 
 general terms, without specific content or reference to facts, buyers are expected 
 to and do understand that they are not entitled to rely literally upon the words. 
 
RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS § 542 cmt. e. While statements of opinion do not 
usually give rise to actionable fraud, more specific statements upon which listeners may 
reasonably rely may be actionable. See, e.g., James v. Lifeline Mobile Medics, 341 
Ill.App.3d 451, 275 Ill.Dec. 230, 792 N.E.2d 461 (2003) (misrepresentation regarding 
defendant’s pending bankruptcy during settlement negotiations actionable, since such a 
specific statement involved more than mere statement of opinion). 
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expose her client to a suit for fraud based on the clearly material nature of this 
misrepresentation.66 On the other hand, she could probably state that they have received 
another offer and suggest to the $42 million bidder that it will cost $50 million to 
purchase the business. When this statement is made, the lawyer is not disclosing the 
actual value of the other offer. She is truthfully indicating that they have received another 
offer, and engaging in mere puffery when she indicates that it will take $50 million to 
purchase her client’s firm. Since the latter point clearly concerns the settlement intention 
of her client, it is nonmaterial information within the meaning of the Comment 2 
exclusion. What could she ethically say if the other party directly asks her if they have 
received a $50 million offer from the other party? She may not answer this inquiry 
affirmatively, because they have not received such an offer, and such a misrepresentation 
would concern material fact. She could, however, indicate that such information is 
confidential and reiterate that it will take $50 million to purchase her client’s business. 
 Does it matter whether attorney misrepresentations regarding client values and 
settlement intentions are conveyed to lawyers representing other clients as opposed to 
judicial mediators or private mediators? In 1993, the American Bar Association indicated 
that knowing misrepresentations regarding client values and settlement intentions made 
to judicial mediators would be impermissible, based upon the view that the Comment 2 
                                               
66 See Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Building Corp., 328 Mass. 341, 103 N.E.2d 692 
(1952) (actionable fraud for real estate owner to tell lessee he had an offer from a third 
party for an exaggerated rental amount in an effort to induce the lessee to enter into a new 
lease at an unwarranted rental rate).  See generally Perschbacher, supra Note    , at 90, 
127-29; Anne M. Burr, Ethics in Negotiation: Does Getting to Yes Require Candor? 17 
NEG. J. 8, 10-11 (2001); G. Richard Shell, Bargaining With the Devil Without Losing 
Your Soul in WHAT’S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS 57, 58-65  (Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler, eds., 2004). 
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exception only applies to bargaining interactions with opposing counsel.67 Since such 
misstatements to judicial officials would not be confined to adversarial interactions, they 
would contravene Rule 4.1. 
 In 2006, the American Bar Association had to decide whether the logic of Formal 
Opin. 93-370 barred misrepresentations regarding client values and settlement intentions 
to nonjudicial mediators.68 If it followed the reasoning of its 1993 opinion, it would have 
had to decide that lawyers could not misstate client values and settlement intentions to 
any neutral parties, but it felt uncomfortable with such an expansive prohibition. As a 
result, it decided to limit the coverage of the prior opinion to judicial offers, and it held 
that such conversations with judicial facilitators are governed by Model Rule 3.3(a)(1)69 
which forbids lawyers from knowingly making false statements of material fact to 
tribunals. It then indicated that Comment 2 to Rule 4.1 would apply to communications 
between advocates and nonjudicial mediators, allowing parties to engage in traditional 
puffing and embellishment in such settings. I agree with this ruling, since when I function 
as a nonjudicial mediator, the parties regularly misrepresent their client values and 
settlement intentions during both our joint and separate caucus sessions. 
 B.  Misleading Partial Disclosures 
 Negotiators often use selective disclosures to enhance their positions. They 
discuss the legal doctrines and factual information beneficial to their situations and 
withhold the circumstances that are not helpful. In most instances, these selective 
                                               
67  ABA Formal Opin. 93-370 (1993). 
 
68  ABA Formal Opin. 06-439 (2006). 
 
69  See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supr Note 20, at 79. 
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disclosures are expected by opponents and are considered an inherent aspect of 
bargaining interactions. When attorneys emphasize their strengths, opposing counsel 
must work to ascertain their hidden weaknesses. Probing questions can be effectively 
employed to explore areas not being discussed. 
 There are times when the partial disclosure of information is improper, because of 
legal obligations requiring full disclosure. For example, securities regulations generally 
require stock and bond sellers to disclose certain information to prospective purchasers. 
The housing laws in many states require sellers to disclose serious defects even if they 
are not asked about such circumstances. When such affirmative obligations are imposed, 
attorneys are obliged to disclose the requisite information or expose their clients to 
liability. 
 Under some circumstances, partial statements may mislead opposing counsel as 
effectively as overt misrepresentations. For example, the plaintiff in Spaulding v. 
Zimmerman70 sustained cracked ribs and fractured clavicles in an automobile accident. 
After the ribs and clavicles had healed, the defense attorney had the plaintiff examined by 
his own medical expert who found an aorta aneurysm that neither the claimant nor his 
attorney knew about. Although the defense lawyer was under no ethical obligation to 
voluntarily disclose the existence of the aneurysm and could ignore questions regarding 
the independent medical examiner’s findings, he could certainly not overtly misrepresent 
the doctor’s diagnosis. Would it be ethical for the defense counsel to respond to plaintiff 
attorney questions regarding this matter by stating that “the ribs and the clavicles have  
healed”? Would such a partial disclosure constitute a deliberate misrepresentation of 
                                               
70  263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962). 
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material fact due to the fact the defendant lawyer realized that the claimant’s attorney 
would interpret such a statement as an indication that everything had healed? Comment 1 
to Rule 4.1 expressly addresses this issue when it indicates that “[m]isrepresentations can 
also occur by partially true but misleading statements . . . that are the equivalent of 
affirmative false statements.”71 Although defense counsel could most likely say nothing 
about the aneurysm, he could not provide a statement that, while true, is clearly 
misleading to the claimant’s attorney.72 Lawyers must thus forego statements that are 
facially true, but which they know are misleading to listeners who do not appreciate the 
inherent deception involved. 
 C.  Nondisclosure of Information 
 Although Model Rule 4.1 requires attorneys to be truthful when they make 
representations concerning material law or fact, Comment 1 indicates that lawyers have 
“no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts.”73 In the absence of 
special relations imposing fiduciary relationships or express contractual or statutory 
duties, practitioners are normally not obligated to divulge relevant legal or factual 
                                               
71  See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by 
Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1999). 
 
72  It is interesting to note that the American Bar Association recently amended Model 
Rule 1.6, governing the voluntary disclosure of confidential client information, to permit 
– but not require – disclosure of the type of information involved in the Spaulding case 
where the lawyer reasonably believes that such disclosure is “necessary to prevent 
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.” See MORGAN & ROTUNDA 
supra Note 20, at 22. 
 
73  MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra Note 20, at 93. 
 
 34 
information to their opponents.74 This doctrine is premised upon the duty imposed upon 
representatives to conduct their own legal research and factual investigations. Under our 
adversary system, lawyers do not have the right to expect their opponents to assist them 
in this regard.75 It is only when cases reach tribunals that Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) imposes 
an affirmative obligation on advocates “to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the 
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the 
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”76  It is interesting to note that no such duty 
is imposed upon litigants by Rule 3.3(a)(2) with respect to pertinent factual 
circumstances that may favor the other side which have not been discovered by opposing 
counsel. 
 Stare v. Tate77 involved divorce negotiations designed to divide the spouses’ 
community property on an equal basis. When valuing certain property, Ms. Stare’s 
attorney made a mathematical error that understated the actual value by $100,000. 
Although Mr. Tate and his lawyer were aware of this miscalculation, they said nothing 
and agreed to settlement terms that deprived Ms. Stare of $50,000. Since Mr. Tate and his 
                                               
74  See Barry R. Temkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in Settlement Negotiations: 
Should There Be a Silent Safe Harbor? 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 179 (2004); Robert 
McKay, Ethical Considerations in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 45 ARB. J. 15, 19 
(March 1990); Thomas F. Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 
99, 116 (1982-83); Deborah A. DeMott, Do you Have the Right to Remain Silent? Duties 
of Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 65 (1994). See also Alan 
Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 337 
(1997). 
 
75  See Hazard, supra Note 22, at 185-86. 
 
76  MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra Note 20, at 79. 
 
77  21 Cal.App.3d 432, 98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1971). 
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attorney were fully aware of Ms. Stare’s miscalculation and sought to take advantage of 
it, the court reformed the property settlement to provide Ms. Stare with the additional 
$50,000 she deserved. 
 Stare v. Tate should be compared with Brown v. County of Genesee78 which 
concerned a county attorney who was negotiating the resolution of a Rehabilitation Act 
claim with the lawyer representing a diabetic employee. The claimant attorney made a 
proposal to place the employee on a certain salary level which they believed to be the 
highest she could attain, when she could actually have been placed at a higher level. The 
court found that the county attorney had no legal or ethical duty to correct their erroneous 
belief in this regard, since the mistake by the claimant and her counsel was due to their 
failure to examine or understand the public records available to everyone, and her counsel 
could have requested this information. The court thus refused to modify the claimant’s 
settlement agreement to allow her to receive the higher salary, because the mistaken 
belief was unilateral, rather than mutual. Should the county attorney, as a public official, 
have been under an affirmative duty to correct the claimant’s obvious misunderstanding, 
or should the conventional rule of caveat emptor applicable to private sector negotiators 
have been controlling? May the Brown determination be distinguished from the holding 
in Stare v. Tate, based upon the fact Stare involved a wholly private issue while Brown 
involved a public record that anyone could have checked? 
 Suppose attorneys representing a severely injured plaintiff learn, during the 
critical stages of settlement discussions, that their client has died due to factors unrelated 
to the underlying law suit. Would they be under an ethical duty to disclose this fact to 
                                               
78  872 F.2d 169 (6th  Cir. 1989). 
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defense counsel who are clearly assuming continuing pain and medical care for the 
plaintiff? In Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage,79 the court held that the 
claimant’s counsel had a clear duty to disclose the death of his client both to the court and 
to opposing counsel prior to the negotiation of a settlement agreement. Since the death of 
the claimant would presumably have necessitated the substitution of plaintiff’s estate 
executor, plaintiff counsel should have been obliged to notify defense attorneys of the 
plaintiff’s demise before any agreement was concluded that affected the claimant’s 
estate.80 Furthermore, assuming plaintiff attorneys had provided defense counsel with 
answers to interrogatories concerning the medical condition of their client during the 
discovery process, they would have been under a duty to correct these answers once the 
claimant’s condition had become fatal.81 
 Suppose the party possessing the relevant medical information regarding a 
plaintiff is not the plaintiff’s attorney, but rather the defense counsel? This issue was 
directly raised in Spaulding v. Zimmerman,82 which was mentioned previously. 
Spaulding’s ribs and clavicles, which had been fractured in an automobile accident, had 
                                               
79  571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1983). 
 
80  Cf. Kentucky Bar Assn. v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1997) (sustaining 
public reprimand for plainfiff attorney who failed to notify defense counsel that plaintiff 
had died during their settlement negotiations). See also A.B.A. Formal Opinion 95-397 
(1995) (indicating that lawyer’s failure to disclose the death of his client was tantamount 
to making a false statement of material fact in violation of Model Rule 4.1). 
 
81  Fed. Rule of Civ. Pro. 26(e)(2) provides that “[a] party is under a duty seasonably to 
amend a prior response to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for 
admission if the party learns that the response is in some material respect incomplete or 
incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made 
known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.” 
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healed, and he seemed to be well on the road to recovery. The physician who conducted 
an independent medical examination for the defense attorneys discovered an aneurysm on 
Spaulding’s aorta. Defense counsel was never asked by plaintiff counsel about the results 
of this examination, and he did not volunteer any information regarding the physician’s 
findings. 
 A settlement agreement was achieved, which had to be approved by the trial 
judge, since David Spaulding was a minor. After the case was settled, Spaulding’s 
condition was discovered during a military induction physical, and the aneurysm was 
surgically repaired. He discovered that the defense counsel was aware of this condition, 
and he moved to set aside the prior settlement agreement. The trial judge vacated the 
agreement, and the case was appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Despite the fact 
that most people would undoubtedly regard an affirmative duty to disclose the critical 
medical information to be the morally appropriate approach,83 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court correctly determined that the defense attorneys were under no ethical duty to 
volunteer the discovered aneurysm to plaintiff counsel. In fact, without client consent, the 
confidentiality preservation obligation then imposed by Model Rule 1.6 precluded 
voluntary disclosure by defense counsel under these circumstances. Comment 5 expressly 
stated that “[t]he confidentiality rule . . . applies not merely to matters communicated in 
                                               
83  These persons would probably expect the examining physician to be under a similar 
duty to disclose the aneurysm pursuant to the Hippocratic Oath. Even though the doctor 
was not a treating physician but only an expert witness retained by the defense counsel, 
their obligation to do no harm should oblige him to disclose such a life-threatening 
condition even if he is not treating the person being examined. 
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confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, 
whatever its source.”84 
 The Spaulding Court circumvented the Rule 1.6 prohibition by holding that as 
officers of the court, defense counsel had an affirmative duty under Rule 3.3(a)(1)85 to 
disclose the newly discovered medical information to the trail judge prior to his approval 
of the settlement agreement. Had Spaulding not been a minor, the Court may have been 
obliged to enforce the original accord, because of the absence of any trial court 
involvement in the settlement process. 
 If courts are unwilling to impose affirmative disclosure obligations on advocates 
who possess such critical information pertaining to opposing clients, they should sustain 
the resulting settlement agreements despite the lack of disclosure. This would at least 
permit defense lawyers to divulge the crucial information as soon as the settlement terms 
have been satisfied. By voiding such agreements after plaintiffs learn of the withheld 
information, judges effectively require defense counsel to remain silent even after law 
suits have been finally resolved. 
 The Restatement (3rd) of the Law Governing Lawyers protects defense attorneys 
who divulge medical information in Spaulding-type situations. Section 66 indicates that 
attorneys who voluntarily disclose information concerning a condition posing a 
reasonably certain risk of death or serious bodily injury to opposing counsel should not 
                                               
84  THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,  2004 SELECTED 
STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 179-180 (Foundation Press 
2004). The same language is now found in Comment 3, see MORGAN & ROTUNDA, 
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discussed below. 
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be found in violation of Rule 1.6 nor be subject to legal malpractice liability to their own 
clients.86 In 2003, the ABA House of Delegates amended Model Rule 1.6 to comport 
with Section 66 of the Restatement. Rule 1.6(b)(1) now permits – but does not require – 
attorneys to disclose otherwise confidential information when necessary “to prevent 
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”87 
 Suppose plaintiff or defense counsel are on the verge of a law suit settlement 
based upon a line of State Supreme Court cases favoring their client. The morning of the 
day they are scheduled to finalize their transaction, the State Supreme Court issues an 
opinion overturning the prior beneficial decisions and indicating that the new rule applies 
to all pending cases. Would knowledgeable attorneys whose position has been completely 
undermined by these legal changes be obligated to inform their unsuspecting opponents 
about this critical development before the settlement agreement is executed? Most 
practitioners I ask respond in the negative, based on their belief that legal counsel are 
obliged to conduct their own legal research. They could not, however, continue to cite the 
decisions that have been overruled, because such legal misstatements would contravene 
Rule 4.1. 
 Suppose that settlement talks have been continuing while a defense motion for 
summary judgment has been pending before the trial court. One morning, the claimant 
attorney receives a court order in the mail indicating that the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment had been granted. The plaintiff lawyer telephones the defense counsel 
                                               
86  See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD: 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 496 (2000). 
 
87  MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra Note 20, at 22. See 72 U.S. LAW WEEK (No. 6) 
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and realizes that she has not yet received notice of her summary judgment victory. Could 
plaintiff counsel try to settle the case immediately without disclosing this fact? No Model 
Rule appears to answer this question, and a few attorneys have told me that they would 
have no hesitancy to seek a final accord without disclosure. Most lawyers, however, 
believe that as officers of the court they would be under an affirmative duty to notify 
defense counsel of the court’s communication since such a notice is expected to reach 
both sides simultaneously. A number of judges I have asked have unanimously agreed 
with the latter view, suggesting that they would vacate any settlement achieved by 
plaintiff counsel without disclosure. 
 D.  Deception by Disingenuous Conduct  
 Suppose two parties are negotiating and one provides the other with a written 
proposal. The recipient of the proposal looks disappointed, tears up the written document, 
and walks out of the room. If the terms set forth in the proposal are actually within the 
settlement range of the recipient, would that person’s actions be unethical since designed 
to mislead the offeror? Most legal practitioners would answer in the negative, on the 
ground the misleading demonstrative behavior concerns their underlying settlement 
intentions that are considered nonmaterial fact information under Comment 2 to Rule 4.1. 
Such threats or bluffs are part of many bargaining interactions. They may hinder effective 
integrative negotiations, but they may be effectively employed by individuals seeking to 
claim value for themselves.88 Only communitarian-oriented theorists who believe that no 
                                               
88  See generally Debra L. Shapiro & Robert J. Bies, Threats, Bluffs, and Disclaimers in 




deceitful conduct should be permitted during bargaining interactions would be likely to 
consider such actions to be improper.89 
 E.  Unintended Access to Confidential Opponent Information 
 When attorneys provide documents pursuant to discovery requests or send 
negotiation proposals to opposing counsel, they occasionally include confidential or 
privileged client documents they did not intend to include. What should  opposing 
counsel do when the realize that they have received documents they were not supposed to 
see? Model Rule 4.4(b) states that “[a] lawyer who receives a document relating to the 
representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the 
document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”90 
 Before or after receiving attorneys notify opposing counsel of their receipt of 
documents not intended for their viewing, may they examine those papers? Neither Rule 
4.4(b) nor the Comments following that Rule answer this question. “Whether the lawyer 
is required to take additional steps, such as returning the original document, is a matter of 
law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is whether the privileged status of a document 
has been waived.”91 
      Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for example, when the 
 lawyer learns before receiving the document that it was inadvertently sent to the 
 wrong address. Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law to do so, the 
 decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional 
 judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer.92 
                                               
89  See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 45, 79-81 (1994-95). 
 
90  MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra Note 20, at 97. 
 
91  Comment 2, MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra Note 20, at 97. 
 
92  Comment 3, MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra Note 20, at 97. 
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 I do not believe that the ABA should provide such ambiguous and unhelpful 
guidance. In ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 (1992), the ABA indicated that attorneys who 
receive confidential or privileged materials from opposing counsel that appear to have 
been sent to them inadvertently should refrain from examining those materials. They 
were directed to notify opposing counsel of the circumstances and abide by the 
instructions provided by those persons. Current Rule 4.4(b) continues to require attorneys 
who obtain confidential or privileged information that seems to have been inadvertently 
sent by opposing counsel to notify those lawyers, but the receiving attorneys are no 
longer obliged to refrain from examining those documents nor must they abide by the 
instructions they receive from the sending lawyers. 
 I believe that the modified Rule 4.4(b) pessimistically assumes that most legal 
representatives are dishonorable persons who will not voluntarily refrain from taking 
advantage of erroneous disclosures of confidential or privileged information by opposing 
attorneys. It thus inexplicably allows recipients of mistakenly sent information to peruse 
those materials. I think that most attorneys are honest persons who would not take undue 
advantage of such errors by other lawyers. As soon as it becomes clear that they have 
received documents not intended for their viewing, the vast majority would be willing to 
refrain from any further examination of those materials. They would immediately notify 
opposing counsel of their apparent mistake and abide by the instructions they receive 
from those individuals. The recipients might be told to return the documents unread, or to 
destroy them without further examination. The fact that a few attorneys would take undue 
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advantage of such errors by opposing counsel should not dictate the obligations that 
should be imposed on honorable lawyers. 
 A somewhat related issue arises with respect to e-mail communications 
exchanged by legal representatives. When people send Word or WordPerfect files, the 
electronic files contain metadata which recipients can access. This allows the recipients 
of such electronic files to ascertain every change made in those files since their creation. 
Attorneys drafting demand letters or other position statements may make numerous 
modifications which demonstrate the degree to which they have altered their positions. 
For example, plaintiff attorneys may increase or decrease the amount of money they are 
claiming for their clients, or defense lawyers may inadvertently disclose weaknesses in 
their positions. When I talk to legal practitioners about the ability of others to mine the 
metadata contained in the electronic files they send, the overwhelming majority are 
shocked. They have no idea what I am talking about. 
 Legal representatives who receive electronic files from other attorneys should 
recognize the fact that most of the senders are unaware of the metadata contained in those 
files. If they were aware of these metadata, they would take precautions to eliminate 
them. The senders expect the recipients to open the files and see exactly what the 
ssenders could see on their computer monitors or on the printed versions of those files. 
They do not expect the file recipients to ascertain the changes they have made in those 
files. In ABA Formal Opinion 06-442 (2006), the ABA ignored this fact and indicated 
that lawyers have no ethical obligation to refrain from mining and using the metadata 
embedded in electronic files received from other attorneys. Although Comment 2 to Rule 
4.4 indicates that the term “‘document’ includes e-mail or other electronic modes of 
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transmission subject to being read or put into readable form,”93 the most the recipients of 
such files must do is notify the senders of their mistake. They do not have to refrain from 
mining the metadata, nor do they have to abide by any instructions they may receive from 
the transmitting attorneys.94 
 The New York Bar,95 the Alabama Bar,96 and the Maine Bar97 have indicated that 
such mining of metadata in electronic files contravenes Model Rule 8.4 which states that 
it constitutes “professional misconduct” for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation [or] . . . that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.”98 The Alabama Bar acknowledged that the “mining of 
metadata constitutes a knowing and deliberate attempt by the recipient attorney to acquire 
confidential and privileged information in order to obtain an unfair advantage against an 
opposing party.” 
 I agree with the New York, Alabama, and Maine Bar Associations. Attorneys 
who receive electronic files should only be permitted to open those files to see what the 
sending lawyers intended them to see. It should be entirely unethical for them to mine the 
metadata they know the senders did not realize they had included in their electronic files. 
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The recipients should not have to notify the senders of their inadvertent inclusion of those 
metadata, because they should not be looking for those metadata. 
 All state bar associations should advise attorneys practicing in their jurisdictions 
about the presence of metadata in electronic files. The New York Bar,99 the Alabama 
Bar,100 and the Maine Bar101 have concluded that attorneys have an ethical obligation 
under the confidentiality duty imposed by Model Rule 1.6 to use “reasonable care” when 
transmitting electronic documents to prevent the inclusion of metadata containing 
confidential or privileged client information. There are several ways lawyers sending 
electronic files can preclude the unintended transmission of such metadata. They can use 
a scrubbing software program designed to eliminate the metadata from files before they 
are sent to opposing counsel. They can alternatively create new files and then insert the 
existing files into the newly created files. This insertion option eliminates the metadata 
contained in the existing files that were inserted into the newly created files. At a 
minimum, they should only transmit PDF files which minimize the metadata contained in 
them. 
V. INAPPROPRIATE TACTICS AND UNCONSCIONABLE AGREEMENTS
 In recent years, an increasing number of legal representatives – especially in 
larger urban areas – have decided to employ offensive negotiation tactics to advance 
client interests. They behave in a rude, sarcastic, or nasty manner. I have even noticed an 
increase in such behavior by students in my Legal Negotiation course. Such actors 
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erroneously equate discourteous behavior with effective advocacy. They use these 
techniques as a substitute for negotiation proficiency. Capable negotiators recognize the 
fact that discourteous behavior is the least effective means of inducing competent 
opponents to give in to bargaining requests.102 
 Lawyers should never employ tactics that are merely intended to humiliate or 
harass opponents. Model Rule 4.4(a) provides that “a lawyer shall not use means that 
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden third persons . . 
.”103 Highly competitive win-lose negotiators may seek to achieve the complete 
annihilation of adversaries through rude and degrading conduct. Although such behavior 
may induce a few unskilled and timid persons to concede more than they should, 
proficient bargainers would not allow such tactics to weaken their resolve. In fact, such 
conduct would be likely to have the opposite effect. They would refuse to move to avoid 
exploitation by such unprofessional opponents. 
 Uncivil and unprofessional conduct is not only morally reprehensible, but it also 
exposes the offensive actors to future recriminations that could subvert their future 
bargaining encounters. Persons offended by rude tactics would work to deny such 
individuals what they wanted to achieve in future interactions, and they would inform 
their colleagues of the unprofessional nature of their approach. Persons who know of the 
negative reputations of hard bargainers would thoroughly prepare for negotiations with 
such actors, and would work to deny those persons the concessions they seek to obtain 
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through openly intimidating behavior. Legal negotiators need to recall the sagacious 
advice they received from parents during their formative years: “You get far more with 
honey than with vinegar!”104  
 When attorneys use personally offensive tactics to harass or intimidate opponents, 
their behavior should be found to violate Rule 4.4(a). Such conduct really has no purpose 
other than to “burden third persons.” If bar associations were to believe that the general 
language of Rule 4.4(a) does not clearly cover such rude actions, they should consider 
amendments to make it unequivocally clear that nasty and personally insulting behavior 
is unprofessional and unethical. If a few highly offensive practitioners were disciplined 
for wholly unacceptable conduct, bar members contemplating such actions would be 
deterred, and other attorneys would find practice more pleasant. 
 Many negotiations are conducted through telephone conversations. In the near 
future, such interactions will be conducted by video phones via Internet connections. 
Since most individuals do not hear all of the words spoken during these discussions – and 
would undoubtedly miss many nonverbal signals emanating from opposing counsel – 
they may be tempted to secretly record their bargaining conversations to enable them to 
review those interactions carefully once they have ended. Would such behavior be 
ethical? Although federal law does not prohibit the secret taping of telephone calls by one 
of the participants without the other party’s knowledge, some state laws make such 
conduct illegal. In those jurisdictions, it would clearly be improper for lawyers to secretly 
tape telephone conversations with other attorneys.  
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 In states where it is not unlawful for one party to secretly tape phone 
conversations with others, would it be ethical for negotiating lawyers to tape discussions 
with opposing counsel? Some state bar associations have indicated that where secret 
taping is not proscribed, attorneys do not behave unethically when they engage in such 
behavior.105 Other state bar associations, however, have reached the opposite conclusion, 
believing that attorneys conducting telephone interactions with other lawyers have the 
right to expect those discussions to remain untapped without the knowledge and consent 
of both participants. I agree with this perspective. When legal representatives interact – 
by telephone or even in person – they should not fear that their conversations are being 
taped for future examination by opposing counsel unless they have expressly agreed to 
such an approach. 
 Proposed Rule 4.3 of the Discussion Draft of the ABA Model Rules would have 
precluded attorneys from concluding agreements “the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know . . . would be held to be unconscionable as a matter of law . . .”106 This provision 
would have codified that admonition of Judge Alvin Rubin to avoid the negotiation of 
“unconscionable deals.”107 This provision was omitted from the final draft, most likely 
because of its superfluous nature. If bargained agreements are “unconscionable as a 
matter of law,” they are subject to legal challenges that may negate their enforceability. It 
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thus behooves legal representatives to avoid the consummation of truly unconscionable 
accords. 
 What about seemingly one-sided arrangements that have not been procured 
through improper means and that do not constitute legally unconscionable agreements. 
Should it be considered unethical or morally reprehensible for attorneys to obtain such 
contracts? Such a concept would place the responsible lawyers in a tenuous position. If 
courts would be unlikely to find the resulting accords unlawful and the opposing parties 
were perfectly willing to enter into the apparently skewed arrangements, should the 
prevailing legal representatives refuse to consummate the deals simply because they think 
they may unreasonably disadvantage their opponents?108 Why should the subjective 
personal judgments of these sanctimonious lawyers take precedence over the willingness 
of opposing parties to effectuate the proposed exchanges – and the right of their own 
clients to obtain the benefits of the bargains that have been struck?109 These individuals 
may not know – and may never know – why their opponents found these deals 
acceptable. Their adversaries may have been aware of factual or legal circumstances that 
either undermined their own positions or bolstered those of the other side. 
 Picture the situation where the claimant attorney believes that $500,000 would 
constitute a “fair” resolution of the underlying dispute. During the bargaining 
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discussions, it becomes clear that the opposing lawyer thinks the plaintiff deserves more. 
She offers $850,000. The claimant representative contacts his client and indicates that the 
defendant offered $850,000, but he decided to accept $500,000 due to his belief that the 
$850,000 figure is “excessive.” I could not image many clients who would be satisfied 
with such a conclusion. At a minimum, the lawyer would be under an obligation under 
Model Rule 1.4 to promptly inform his client of the defendant’s offer,110 and Model Rule 
1.2(a) would require him to “abide by [his] client’s decision whether to settle [the] 
matter.”111 I could easily imagine a legal malpractice suit brought by such a client against 
the responsible attorney who decided to forego the $850,000 offer in favor of the “more 
reasonable” $500,000 figure. It would certainly be appropriate for such an attorney to 
suggest to his client that the $850,000 offer seems excessive, but if the client decides to 
accept the higher figure, I think the lawyer would be obliged to follow the client’s 
instructions.112 
 Once negotiators achieve final agreements, one side usually drafts the actual 
terms. If an attorney were to deliberately change a term or delete something that was 
agreed upon, the client could be held liable for fraud and the legal representative would 
be subject to discipline.113 Negotiators have a clear duty to prepare documents that 
                                               
110  Comment 2 to Rule 1.4 explicitly imposes this obligation on attorneys negotiating on 
behalf of clients. See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra Note 20, at 17. 
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represent the terms the parties intended to constitute their accord. Suppose one side 
prepares the agreement, and the opposing party realizes that the drafter has inadvertently 
omitted a provision agreed upon? Although no Model Rule explicitly addresses this 
situation, ABA Formal Opinion 86-1518 (1986) indicated that the party aware of the 
omission should contact the drafting attorney to correct the omission. 
 Suppose the attorney representing Side B in a negotiation believes the Side A has 
agreed to pay Side B $28 million. When she receives the draft agreement from Side A, 
the document indicates that Side A is to pay Side B $30 million. Would the Side B legal 
representative be under an obligation to notify the Side A lawyer of this apparent 
mistake? I think the answer is yes, but I think she should do so carefully. During the rush 
to conclude bargaining interactions, parties often exchange terms quickly. It is possible 
that Side A actually suggested the $30 million figure in exchange for some final 
concessions being made by Side B. She should thus contact the Side A representative and 
indicate that she cannot recall the precise amount agreed upon. If the Side A lawyer 
affirms the $30 million figure, she should accept this representation. On the other hand, if 
the Side A representative realizes his mistake and suggests that $28 million was the 
amount actually intended, the Side B lawyer should accept the correction.114 
 May attorneys who represent clients in civil actions arising out of arguably 
criminal conduct (e.g., a sexual harassment lawsuit arising from physical conduct by the 
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defendant) suggest the possibility of criminal charges being filed if the civil suit 
negotiations are not resolved in a satisfactory manner? DR 7-105(A) of the ABA Code of 
Professional Responsibility, which is still followed by a few jurisdictions, states that 
lawyers “shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal 
charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.”115 This provision might be read 
to prevent the mention of possible criminal prosecution to advance civil suit negotiations. 
Nonetheless, courts have acknowledged that neither DR 7-105(A), nor laws proscribing 
extortion or compounding of felonies, should be interpreted to prevent civil litigants from 
mentioning the possibility of criminal action if related civil claims are not resolved or to 
preclude clients from agreeing to forego the filing of criminal charges in exchange for 
compensation to be paid to resolve the civil matters.116 Legal representatives must be 
careful, however, not to use the threat of criminal prosecution to obtain more than is 
owed to their clients or have their clients agree not to testify at future criminal trials. 
“Seeking payment beyond restitution in exchange for foregoing criminal prosecution or 
seeking any payments in exchange for not testifying at a criminal trial . . . are still clearly 
prohibited.”117 In a similar case, the Oregon Supreme Court held that it was unethical for 
an attorney to threaten the possibility of criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage 
regarding negotiations pertaining to a related civil matter.118 A threat to invoke criminal 
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charges to enhance one’s position in an unrelated civil dispute would almost certainly be 
improper, because of the extortionate nature of such a threat.119 
 The Model Rules do not contain any provision analogous to DR 7-105(A), and it 
is clear that the drafters intentionally chose not to prohibit the threat of criminal action to 
advance civil suit settlement discussions pertaining to the same operative 
circumstances.120 As a result, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility indicated in ABA Formal Opinion 92-363 (1992) that it is not unethical 
under the Model Rules for attorneys to mention the possibility of criminal charges during 
civil suit negotiations, so long as they do “not attempt to exert or suggest improper 
influence over the criminal process.”121 Nevertheless, legal representatives must still not 
demand excessive compensation that may contravene applicable extortion statutes or 
promise that their clients will not testify at future criminal trials, since such a 
commitment would contravene public policy. 
VI. ETHICAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO COLLABORATIVE LAW AND 
 COOPERATIVE LAW ARRANGEMENTS 
  
 The Collaborative Law movement began in the early 1990s by family law 
practitioners who wanted to decrease the adversarial nature of their bargaining 
interactions.122 Family law disputes often involve highly emotional issues that 
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significantly affect divorcing spouses – and their children. Many attorneys specializing in 
this area have functioned in a tough and competitive manner. As family law practitioners 
began to appreciate the fact that this adversarial approach generated negative 
consequences both for themselves and their clients, a number of innovative lawyers 
decided to develop a more open and cooperative style based upon the Getting to Yes 
model. 
 Family law practitioners and their clients execute a four-way agreement 
specifying the cooperative/problem-solving approach they will follow. The participants 
promise to be completely open and to share all relevant information on a voluntary basis. 
They will interact in a professional and respectful manner designed to generate mutually 
beneficial and jointly efficient settlement agreements with a minimum of discomfort to 
the lawyers and their clients. The legal negotiators will be open and direct, and will never 
resort to bluffing, puffing, and other value-claiming behavior. The most controversial 
aspect of their four-way agreements acknowledge that if the current parties are unable to 
reach a settlement, the lawyers will be disqualified and not be permitted to take the 
underlying dispute to trial. The clients will have to retain other counsel to carry out that 
function. 
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 The major ethical issue thus far examined with respect to the propriety of 
Collaborative Law arrangements has concerned the disqualification provision. The 
Colorado Bar123 found that the disqualification obligation contravened Model Rule 
1.7(a)(2) which forbids an attorney from representing a client if there is a significant risk 
that the client’s representation may be “materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities 
to . . . a third person,” unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will 
not be adversely affected and (2) the client consents to the representation after 
consultation with the attorney.124 The Colorado Bar found that the disqualification 
provision creates an obligation to third persons – opposing counsel and opposing clients – 
that involves a conflict between the lawyer and his or her client that cannot be cured by 
mere client consent. On the other hand, the American Bar Association considered the 
same issue and concluded that the potential conflict was not so insurmountable that a 
client could not consent to the disqualification provision.125  
 Before client consent should be acceptable, lawyers should be obliged to explain 
in detail the potential consequences of the disqualification provision. If cases are not 
resolved amicably, new attorneys will have to be retained, those legal representatives will 
have to become familiar with all of the relevant case information, and legal costs are 
likely to increase substantially. While the likelihood of such a result is generally low, 
especially where the Collaborative Law attorneys are working diligently to avoid the 
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need for litigation, clients must appreciate the negative consequences that might arise if 
mutual arrangements cannot be achieved. 
 Ethical issues can also arise under Model Rule 1.2(c) which provides that “[a] 
lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the 
circumstances and the client gives informed consent.”126 Collaborative Law practitioners 
have agreed among themselves to avoid many traditional negotiating tactics that might 
advance their own client interests at the expense of opposing parties. ABA Formal 
Opinion 07-447 found that the Collaborative Law Agreement limitations did not 
contravene Rule 1.2 (c), so long as they did not interfere with the concomitant attorney 
duties of competence and diligence. New Jersey Bar Ethics Opinion 699127 indicated that 
lawyers must initially determine whether their commitment to Collaborative Law rules 
would be “reasonable” under Rule 1.2. The opinion suggested that it would not be 
“reasonable” for attorneys to require client commitment to their withdrawal where the 
legal representatives believe there would be a significant possibility the collaborative 
process would fail and the clients would have to retain the services of replacement 
attorneys.128 After they assess the potential risks associated with the Collaborative Law 
Rules, attorneys should carefully explain those risks to their clients to be certain that 
client consent to Collaborative Law representation it truly informed. 
 To avoid the potential conflict problem associated with disqualification 
provisions, some legal practitioners developed the Cooperative Law approach which 
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follows the Collaborative Law rules, but with one critical exception. Cooperative Law 
practitioners eliminated the attorney disqualification provision. As a result, if their open 
and cooperative discussions fail to generate settlement agreements, the originally retained 
legal representatives may take the cases to trial. 
 The Collaborative Law movement completely embraces the communitarian law 
concept. These are individuals who are uncomfortable with the traditional give-and-take 
of the bargaining process and with the overt or subtle deceit and competition associated 
with such interactions. Rather than try to diminish rude or unprofessional behavior, while 
still engaging in true legal negotiating, they have created a wholly artificial world which 
is impossible to effectively monitor.  How can they be certain that Collaborative Law 
participants are being completely open? How can they be sure no one has embellished 
their actual bottom line to obtain a bargaining advantage? 
 It has been suggested that a large proportion of Collaborative Law practitioners 
are “women in their fifties and sixties who are ‘tired of arguing with each other’.”129 This 
is consistent with the findings that “women are more likely [than men] to avoid 
competitive situations, less likely to acknowledge competitive wishes, and not likely to 
do as well [as men] in competition.”130  It is also consistent with studies finding 
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differences between the way in which men and women approach lying. Males tend to lie 
for their own benefit (“self-oriented”), while women tend to lie to make others feel good 
and maintain relationships (“other-oriented”).131 It is thus not surprising that women feel 
less comfortable with the “self-oriented” deception inherent in traditional bargaining 
interactions and prefer the Collaborative Law approach which is designed to eliminate 
such mendacity. 
 The Collaborative Law movement has almost certainly excluded 
competitive/adversarial negotiators from their groups. This is a beneficial thing, since 
persons who are overtly competitive and adversarial tend to be ineffective negotiators as 
was found by Professors Williams and Schneider in their studies. Collaborative Law 
people clearly wish to include only cooperative/problem-solvers in their organizations. If 
they could accomplish this objective, their interactions would be pleasant and their 
agreements would be efficient. They would find bargaining interactions to be enjoyable, 
and their clients would have professional representation designed to minimize client 
difficulties. 
 What if lawyers the Collaborative Law people think are cooperative/problem-
solvers are actually competitive/problem-solvers? On the surface, both types of legal 
negotiators behave similarly. They are always courteous and professional, and they work 
to generate efficient agreements. They seem to be open with their critical information, 
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they begin with reasonable opening offers, and seek “fair” results. Nonetheless, skilled 
competitive/problem-solvers disingenuously reflect the styles of cooperative/problem-
solvers for the purpose of claiming more of the bargaining surplus for their own clients. 
Their first goal is to obtain good terms for their own side, before they work to maximize 
the joint returns achieved. If they are able to delude cooperative/problem-solving 
opponents into believing that they are also cooperative/problem-solvers, they can exploit 
the naïve openness of such persons.132 Such competitive/problem-solvers are really the 
most deceptive negotiators. They induce opponents to believe they are being completely 
open and direct, when their openness is limited and they are employing deceptive 
behavior to enhance their own circumstances.133 
 How can Collaborative Law participants prevent exploitation by opportunistic and 
manipulative competitive/problem-solvers? They can do what proficient cooperative/ 
problem-solvers now do and disclose their important information slowly. If they are 
convinced their openness is being reciprocated, they can continue to be open. On the 
other hand, if they suspect that their openness is not being fully reciprocated, they must 
behave more strategically themselves by being less open to avoid exploitation.134 They 
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can alternatively do what many naïve cooperative/problem-solvers do and simply pretend 
that competitive/problem-solvers do not exist. This is a make-believe world which allows 
cooperative/problem-solvers to enjoy their interactions even when they compromise the 
interests of their own clients to enable them to avoid difficult interactions they do not 
like. While this approach may enable these legal representatives to avoid the riggers of 
true bargaining, it ill serves their clients.  
 Some Collaborative Law practitioners may put their own interests – and the 
interests of opposing counsel members of the Collaborative Law movement – ahead of 
the interests of their own clients in a manner that seems to contravene Rule 1.3. They are 
not really acting with the “reasonable diligence” required by that Rule. As Comment 1 
indicates, “[a] lawyer must . . . act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the 
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”135 Comment 1 goes on to 
acknowledge that “[a] lawyer is not bound . . . to press for every advantage that might be 
realized for a client,”136 and it further states that “[t]he lawyer’s duty to act with 
reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating 
of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.”  
 Since proficient negotiators generally behave professionally and courteously, the 
commitment of Collaborative Law practitioners to behave respectfully raises no ethical 
dilemmas. In addition, if their commitment to cooperative interactions does not oblige 
them to be overly generous to clients and attorneys on the other side, they would 
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similarly encounter no problems under Rule 1.3.137 Nonetheless, legal representatives 
should not be permitted to place their own interest in avoiding the personal discomfort 
associated with bargaining interactions ahead of the interests of their clients, and if they 
allow their dislike for real bargaining to adversely affect the interests of their clients, 
issues should arise under this provision.138 “[A] lawyer should never compromise the 
legitimate interest of a client for either the lawyer’s own personal interest of the interests 
of any other clients.”139 Nor should they be allowed to do so simply to maintain good 
relationships with other legal practitioners.140 
 “[S]ome form of deceit, at least in the broadest sense of the word, is inherent in all 
negotiations and the lawyer with an obligation to obtain the best result for a client cannot 
be expected, realistically, to negotiate outside the context of everyday convention.”141 
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Legal negotiators who ignore this reality may feel more comfortable with bargaining 
interactions, but they significantly risk the unknowing compromise of client interests. To 
the extent they naively believe that no other practitioners are exaggerating or 
embellishing client interests, they place their own clients at a distinct disadvantage. It is 
as if they are playing poker on behalf of their clients with their cards face up when they 
are not certain they are really able to see all of the cards being held by their opponents. 
By the conclusion of the poker game, the chips will most likely be on the opposing side 
of the table. 
 Collaborative Law attorneys may also encounter difficulties under Rule 1.7(a)(2) 
due to the “significant risk that the representation . . . will be materially limited by the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to . . . a third person …” Some Collaborative Law practitioners 
may be more committed to their relationships with opposing Collaborative Law counsel 
than they are to their own clients because of their on-going interactions with such lawyers 
compared to their one-time representation of current clients. If this factor were to 
diminish their commitment to the advancement of client interests during their 
negotiations with opposing counsel, significant issues could arise under this Rule. 
 Collaborative Law practitioners who do not wish to engage in conventional legal 
negotiations should be obliged to inform their clients of their unwillingness to further 
client interests through this distasteful process. They should also have to advise clients of 
their commitment to the Collaborative Law attorneys on the other side. They should 
explain how they hope that a commitment to the cooperative/problem-solving approach 
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will benefit clients by diminishing inter-client difficulties and by seeking the 
development of mutually efficient accords. On the other hand, they should note that 
competitive/problem-solvers might be able to obtain advantages for their own clients 
without these representatives being aware of their deceptive behavior. Clients have the 
right to know of attorney willingness to sacrifice client interests to serve their own desire 
to avoid unpleasant endeavors and to advance relationships with other lawyers. I doubt 
that many Collaborative Law attorneys would be willing to make such overt 
acknowledgements to their clients. Most will continue to naively pretend that no 
members of their group could possibly behave in a deceptively opportunistic fashion. 
 The issue bar associations have primarily focused on has concerned the 
disqualification provisions associated with Collaborative Law four-way agreements. This 
obligation is designed to maximize cooperative bargaining behavior by making it clear 
that negotiators who fail to achieve mutual accords may not continue to represent their 
clients if the matters are litigated. Given the fact that fewer than five percent – and often 
only one or two percent – of marital dissolution cases are resolved through formal 
adjudications, the disqualification provision is likely to have a minimal impact on clients. 
This is especially true for Collaborative Law participants who are far less likely to litigate 
than their competitive/adversarial cohorts. If clients are unequivocally informed of the 
potential impact of the disqualification provision and they knowingly consent to this term 
hoping to benefit from the more cooperative approach being employed by the attorneys 
involved, I do not believe that state bar associations should find these Collaborative Law 
provisions to contravene the Model Rules based solely upon this consideration. 
Nonetheless, bar associations should be certain that attorneys have complied with Rules 
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1.3 and 1.7 by expressly discussing with clients their commitment to a process designed 
to avoid the give-and-take associated with traditional bargaining interactions and their 
focus on the continuing relationships they have with other Collaborative Law 
practitioners. 
 A recent empirical study by Professors Kathleen O’Connor and Peter Carnevale 
should cause Collaborative Law proponents to think about the degree to which they place 
joint attorney and client interests above the interests of their own clients.142 Their study 
dealt with so-called “common-value issues” which both sides would like to have resolved 
in the identical manner even though they are unaware of their positional overlap. The 
exercise concerned a divorce situation in which the wife desired custody of the children 
and the husband preferred that she have custody. Some of the negotiating dyads were 
completely open regarding their interests with respect to this issue. Other dyads involved 
participants who could be disingenuous with respect to this issue, allowing husband 
representatives to demand custody to enable that side to exchange this issue for other 
actually valued terms later during the interactions. O’Connor and Carnevale found that 
the individualistically motivated dyads achieved higher joint outcomes than the 
cooperatively motivated dyads.143 This was based upon the fact the individualistically 
motivated dyad participants established higher aspirations for themselves than did the 
cooperatively motivated dyad participants. This study would suggest that Collaborative 
Law negotiators should be careful not to allow their distaste for the give and take of 
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traditional bargaining interactions to limit the goals they set for their own clients. If the 
Collaborative Law participants on both sides of such exchanges establish modest 
aspirations and concentrate on making sure that neither side gains at the other side’s 
expense, both sides may end up with terms that do not maximize their potential joint 
returns. This would suggest that Collaborative Law negotiators should remember to 
establish initially beneficial goals for their respective clients before they begin to interact 
with opposing attorneys. The more they work to advance the interests of their own clients 
– while working to cooperate and maximize the joint returns achieved – the more likely 
they will be to generate optimal terms for both sides. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Lawyers negotiate frequently, but many feel uncomfortable with the deception 
inherent in most bargaining interactions. They do not like to exaggerate their positions for 
personal gain or to misrepresent their true client settlement intentions. Although Model 
Rule 4.1 prohibits the knowing misrepresentation of material fact, Comment 2 expressly 
notes that due to accepted bargaining conventions, advocate statements regarding client 
values and client settlement intentions do not concern “material fact.” This exception is 
actually quite narrow. It merely permits “puffing” and “embellishment,” but no overt or 
subvert misstatements of true material fact. Attorneys who misrepresent material 
information risk the loss of reputations for integrity which will significantly undermine 
their ability to practice law. 
 Many law school teachers and a growing group of practicing attorneys have 
decided to reject the conventional bargaining approach in favor of an idealized 
communitarian style which is based -- not upon how most legal negotiators behave -- but 
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rather upon how communitarians think they should behave. A number of lawyers, 
particularly in the family law area, have established the Collaborative Law and the 
Cooperative Law movements to guarantee that participating attorneys will be entirely 
open and candid with each other to ensure pleasant and efficient interactions. These 
practitioners assume that they will all behave in a cooperative/problem-solving manner, 
but ignore the possibility that some members may adopt the hybrid competitive/problem-
solving style designed to make them appear open when they are actually using 
manipulative tactics designed to enable them to claim a greater share of the joint surplus 
for their own side. 
 Collaborative Law and Cooperative Law practitioners may improperly place their 
own desire to avoid the riggers of conventional legal negotiating ahead of the interests of 
their own clients. They also want to maintain beneficial relationships with the attorneys 
on the other side. Because of the potential conflict created between their duties to their 
own clients and the interests of opposing counsel, Collaborative Law and Cooperative 
Law practitioners should be required to explain to their own clients the degree to which 
they wish to avoid personally stressful situations and to maintain harmonious 
relationships with opposing lawyers. Only where they obtain the informed consent of 
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